This paper examines value created through spinoffs over a period from 2002-2010. The net debt to average share price ratio and the debt to asset ratio of a company impacts the decision for this restructuring process statistically significant. The announcement of a spinoff yields abnormal returns (AR) for the stockholders of the parent. The relative size of the spin and the financial leverage correlated with the AR positively, whereas the net debt per share and the return on asset negatively. Therefore, no direct wealth transfer from the debt holders of a company to the equity holders can be derived from these results.

Mestrado em Finanças; This dissertation investigates the evolution and determinants of the household debts in the United States of America (USA) and also in Europe (EU), before and after the beginning of the financial crises. The amounts and the debt incidence (mortgage and nonmortgage) were compared for the two years observed (2006/07 and 2010). After the presentation and discussion of the relevant literature, the determinants that had influence on the indebtedness in the USA and the EU were empirically tested based on the data from Health And Retirement Study (HRS) wave 8 (2006) and wave 10 (2010) and Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) wave 2 (2006) and wave 4 (2010). As the objective is to verify alterations in the individual behavior in the periods pre and post crises, this alteration was analyzed through the observation of the same individual on both moments in time. Various specifications of the Probit model were tested where the dependent variable assumed the value of „one‟ or „zero‟ corresponding to the exist of debt or not. The study was conducted taking under consideration the whole set of debts (liability) and also for each type of debt in the European.( Overdue bills, Debt on cars and other vehicles...

Using for the first time household survey data from 26 post-Communist countries, covering the period 1990-2005, this paper examines correlates of unprecedented increases in inequality registered by most of the economies. The analysis shows, after controlling for country fixed effects and type of survey used, that economic reform is strongly negatively associated with the income share of the bottom decile, and positively with the income shares of the top two deciles. However, breaking economic reform into its component parts, the picture is more nuanced. Large-scale privatization and infrastructure reform (mostly consisting of privatization and higher fees) are responsible for the pro-inequality effect; small-scale privatization tends to raise the income shares of the bottom deciles. Acceleration in growth is also pro-rich. But democratization is strongly pro-poor, as is lower inflation. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis finds no evidence that greater government spending as share of gross domestic income reduces inequality.

The present study uses the GIDD, a CGE-microsimulation model for Global Income Distribution Dynamics, to understand the ex-ante dynamics of global income distribution. Three main robust results emerge. First, under a set of realistic assumptions, there will be a reduction in global income inequality by 2030. This potential reduction can be fully accounted for by the projected convergence in average incomes across countries, with poor and populous countries growing faster than the rest of the world. Second, this convergence process will be accompanied by a widening of income distribution in two-thirds of the developing countries; the main cause being increasing skill premia. Third, a trend that may counter-balance the potential anti-globalization sentiment is the emergence of a global middle class: a group of consumers who demand access to, and have the means to purchase, international goods and services. The results show that the share of these consumers in the global population is likely to more than double in the next 20 years. These ex-ante trends in global income distribution suggest that the mid-1990s could be seen as a turning point after which global inequality began showing a negative tendency.

Incomes in the poorest two quintiles on average increase at the same rate as overall average incomes. This is because, in a global dataset spanning 118 countries over the past four decades, changes in the share of income of the poorest quintiles are generally small and uncorrelated with changes in average income. The variation in changes in quintile shares is also small relative to the variation in growth in average incomes, implying that the latter accounts for most of the variation in income growth in the poorest quintiles. These findings hold across most regions and time periods and when conditioning on a variety of country-level factors that may matter for growth and inequality changes. This evidence confirms the central importance of economic growth for poverty reduction and illustrates the difficulty of identifying specific macroeconomic policies that are significantly associated with the relative growth rates of those in the poorest quintiles.

New data derived directly from household surveys are used to examine the effects of globalization on income distribution in poor and rich countries. The article looks at the impact of openness and of direct foreign investment on relative income shares across the entire income distribution. It finds strong evidence that at low average income levels, the income share of the poor is smaller in countries that are more open to trade. As national income levels rise, the incomes of the poor and the middle class rise relative to the income of the rich. The article explains why using the trade to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in purchasing power parity terms, as favored by some analysts, is inappropriate in studies of the effect of trade on income distribution.

This paper examines whether the degree of spillovers from foreign direct investment is affected by the foreign ownership share in investment projects. The analysis, based on an unbalanced panel of Romanian firms from 1998-2000, provides evidence consistent with positive intra-sectoral spillovers resulting from fully-owned foreign affiliates but not from projects with joint domestic and foreign ownership. This finding is consistent with literature suggesting that foreign investors tend to put more resources into technology transfer to their wholly-owned projects than to those owned partially. The data also indicate that the presence of partially foreign-owned projects is correlated with higher productivity of domestic firms in upstream industries, suggesting that domestic suppliers benefit from contacts with multinational customers. But the opposite is true for fully-owned foreign affiliates, which appear to have a negative effect on domestic firms in upstream industries. These results are consistent with the observation that foreign investors entering a host country through greenfield projects are less likely to source locally than those engaged in joint ventures or partial acquisitions. They are also in line with the evidence suggesting that fully-owned foreign subsidiaries use newer or more sophisticated technologies than jointly-owned investment projects...

When average income rises, the average incomes of the poorest fifth of society rise proportionately. This is a consequence of the strong empirical regularity that the share of income accruing to the bottom quintile does not vary systematically with average income. The authors document this empirical regularity in a sample of 92 countries spanning the past four decades and show that it holds across regions, periods, income levels, and growth rates. The authors next ask whether the factors that explain cross-country differences in the growth rates of average incomes have differential effects on the poorest fifth of society. They find that several determinants of growth--such as good rule of law, opennness to international trade, and developed financial markets--have little systematic effect on the share of income that accrues to the bottom quintile. Consequently, these factors benefit the poorest fifth of society as much as everyone else. Thee is some weak evidence that stabilization from high inflation and reductions in the overall size of government not only increase growth but also increase the income share of the poorest fifth in society. Finally...

The literature on aid and growth has not found a convincing instrumental variable to identify the causal effects of aid. This paper exploits an instrumental variable based on the fact that since 1987, eligibility for aid from the International Development Association (IDA) has been based partly on whether or not a country is below a certain threshold of per capita income. The paper finds evidence that other donors tend to reinforce rather than compensate for reductions in IDA aid following threshold crossings. Overall, aid as a share of gross national income (GNI) drops about 59 percent on average after countries cross the threshold. Focusing on the 35 countries that have crossed the income threshold from below between 1987 and 2010, a positive, statistically significant, and economically sizable effect of aid on growth is found. A one percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio from the sample mean raises annual real per capita growth in gross domestic product by approximately 0.35 percentage points. The analysis shows that the main channel through which aid promotes growth is by increasing physical investment.

Recent trade theory emphasizes the role of market-share reallocations across firms ("stealing") in driving productivity growth, while the older literature focused on average productivity improvements ("learning"). The authors use comprehensive, firm-level data from India's organized manufacturing sector to show that market-share reallocations did play an important role in aggregate productivity gains immediately following the start of India's trade reforms in 1991. However, aggregate productivity gains during the overall period from 1985 to 2004 were driven largely by improvements in average productivity, which can be attributed to India's trade liberalization and FDI reforms.

Brazil was the fastest growing country in the world between 1930 and 1995, with an average annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. By 2000, Brazil's per-capita income stood at R$6,500. While RN's per capita income is slightly above half the national average, it increased from 43 percent of the national average in 1947 to 47 percent in 1998, implying that RN's economy grew faster than that of Brazil for over half a century. This has also been true in recent years. Between 1990-1998, RN's income per capita showed a respectable trend growth rate of 3.0 percent. The close relationship between Brazil's economic growth and RN's economic progress in the last five decades reflects a response to common macroeconomic forces and external environment as well as the enormous influence of national policies and programs on RN's economy. However, the state can also implement policies and programs to stimulate growth and employment. For this purpose, an understanding of trends in state GDP and employment and of the sources of growth is important. RN's economy has undergone a rapid and welcome transformation from one dependent on salt...

Few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries. The authors try to fill this gap by constructing a new data set on poverty, international migration, and remittances for 74 low- and middle-income developing countries. Four key findings emerge: 1) International migration-defined as the share of a country's population living abroad-has a strong, statistical impact in reducing poverty. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty ($1.00 a person a day). 2) Distance to a major labor-receiving region-like the United States or OECD (Europe)-has an important effect on international migration. Developing countries that are located closest to the United States or OECD (Europe) are also those countries with the highest rates of migration. 3) An inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per capita income and international migration. Developing countries with low or high per capita GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than do middle-income developing countries. The authors find no evidence that developing countries with higher levels of poverty produce more migrants. Because of considerable travel costs associated with international migration...

This paper decomposes manufacturing import growth rates in a selected set of large industrial and developing countries (five industrial and eight developing) and measures the relative contributions of domestic demand and market share changes for two separate periods 1991/92 - 2001/02 and 2001/02 - 2007/08. It also shows the shares of imports both from the rest of the world and from developing countries for aggregate and three-digit manufacturing sectors. Import growth is much higher during the 2000s driven by higher demand growth rates. While market share changes explain most of the growth during the 1990s, its contribution is relatively smaller during the 2000s. Imports from developing countries have grown much faster both in industrial and developing country markets driven primarily by market share changes. However, more than half of market share gains by developing countries are caused by the exports of China, which accounts for more than 70 percent of market share gains of developing countries in the sample countries during the 2000s. Despite rapid growth...

This paper employs a simple cross-country panel framework to assess the determinants of growth in Ghana's gross domestic product over the past four decades. A set of standard covariates is used to explain growth rates. Natural resource variables are included because the effects of natural resource rents in gross domestic products are of particular interest for Ghana. Using the preferred specification, Ghana's growth potential is predicted for the upcoming decades under different scenarios. The results indicate that under the most pessimistic scenario of no improvements in the determinants of growth compared with the period 2005-09, Ghana's gross domestic product per capita growth rates will stagnate at approximately 4.5 percent during the next decade and decrease thereafter. If the policy measures and country characteristics improve in the way they did in the past three decades, average per capita growth rates of roughly 5.5 percent could be reached during 2015-34. Taking into account the expected oil production until 2034 adds 0.6 percentage points to projected gross domestic product growth rates on average.

This note analyzes levels and trends of health expenditures by country, income group, and region in the context of overall government revenue, expenditure, and GDP trends between 1995 and 2010. The study uses available data from the World Health Organization's (WHO) National Health Accounts, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) fiscal data bases, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The paper provides snapshots of health financing patterns, both public and private, at different points in time, as well as analyzing the stability of these relationships and tracing their evolution during this period. In general, there is little variation in the average income elasticity's of total, government, and out-of pocket (OOP) health spending by income level or region. The elasticity's of government health spending to total government expenditures and revenues exhibit more variation across both income groups and region than the income elasticity. Controlling for demographics moderately reduces the magnitude of these estimates. Many elasticity estimates are close to one...

Africa will be undergoing substantial demographic changes in the coming decades with the rising working age share of its population. The opportunity of African countries to convert these changes into demographic dividends for growth and poverty reduction will depend on several factors. The outlook will likely be good if African countries can continue the gains already made under better institutions and policies, particularly those affecting the productivity of labor, such as educational outcomes. If African countries can continue to build on the hard-won development gains, the demographic dividend could account for 11 to 15 percent of gross domestic product volume growth by 2030, while accounting for 40 to 60 million fewer poor in 2030. The gains can become much more substantial with even better educational outcomes that allow African countries to catch up to other developing countries. If the skill share of Africa's labor supply doubles because of improvements in educational attainment, from 25 to about 50 percent between 2011 and 30...

The effects of globalization on income distribution in rich and poor countries are a matter of controversy. While international trade theory in its most abstract formulation implies that increased trade and foreign investment should make income distribution more equal in poor countries and less equal in rich countries, finding these effects has proved elusive. The author presents another attempt to discern the effects of globalization by using data from household budget surveys and looking at the impact of openness and foreign direct investment on relative income shares of low and high deciles. The author finds some evidence that at very low average income levels, it is the rich who benefit from openness. As income levels rise to those of countries such as Chile, Colombia, or Czech Republic, for example, the situation changes, and it is the relative income of the poor and the middle class that rises compared with the rich. It seems that openness makes income distribution worse before making it better--or differently in that the effect of openness on a country's income distribution depends on the country's initial income level.

Recent trade theory emphasizes the role of market-share reallocations across firms (“stealing”) in driving productivity growth, whereas previous literature focused on average productivity improvements (“learning”). We use comprehensive, firm-level data from India’s organized manufacturing sector to show that market-share reallocations were briefly relevant to explain aggregate productivity gains following the beginning of India’s trade reforms in 1991. However, aggregate productivity gains during the period from 1985 to 2004 were largely driven by improvements in average productivity. We show that India’s trade, FDI, and licensing reforms are not associated with productivity gains stemming from market share reallocations. Instead, we find that most of the productivity improvements in Indian manufacturing occurred through “learning” and that this learning was linked to the reforms. In the Indian case, the evidence rejects the notion that market share reallocations are the mechanism through which trade reform increases aggregate productivity. Although a plausible response would be that India’s labor laws do not easily permit market share reallocations, we show that restrictions on labor mobility cannot explain our results.

Suppose that all people in the world are allocated only two characteristics: country where they live and income class within that country. Assume further that there is no migration. This paper shows that 90 percent of variability in people's global income position (percentile in world income distribution) is explained by only these two pieces of information. Mean country income (circumstance) explains 60 percent, and income class (both circumstance and effort) 30 percent of global income position. The author finds that about two-thirds of the latter number is due to circumstance (approximated by the estimated parental income class under various social mobility assumptions), which makes the overall share of circumstance unlikely to be less than 75-80 percent. On average, "drawing" one-notch higher income class (on a twenty-class scale) is equivalent to living in a 12 percent richer country. Once people are allocated their income class, it becomes important, not only whether the country they are allocated to is rich or poor...

Pharmaceutical expenditures have grown rapidly in recent decades, and now total nearly 10% of health care costs. Generic drug utilization has risen substantially alongside, from 19% of scripts in 1984 to 47% in 2001, thus tempering expenditure growth through significant direct dollar savings. However, generic drugs may lead to indirect savings as well if their use reduces the average price of those brand-name drugs that are still purchased. Prior work indicates that brand-name producers do not lower their prices in the face of generic competition, and our study confirms that finding. However, prior work is silent on how the mix of consumer choices between generic and brand-name drugs might affect the average price of those brand-name drugs that are purchased. We use a nationally representative panel of data on drug utilization and costs for the years 1996-2001 to examine how the share of an individual's prescriptions filled by generics (generic script share) affects his average out-of-pocket cost for brand-name drugs, and the net cost paid by the insurer. Our principal finding is that a higher generic script share lowers average brand-name prices to consumers, presumably because consumers are more likely to substitute generics when brand-name drugs would cost them more. This effect is substantial: a 10% increase in the consumer's generic script share is associated with a 15.6% decline in the average price paid for brand-name drugs by consumers. This implies that the potential cost savings to consumers from generic substitution are far greater than prior work suggests. In contrast...