Fiscal responsibility laws are institutions with which multiple governments in the same economy -- national and subnational --can commit to help avoid irresponsible fiscal behavior that could have short-term advantages to one of them but that would be collectively damaging. Coordination failures with subnational governments in the 1990s contributed to macroeconomic instability and led several countries to adopt fiscal responsibility laws as part of the remedy. The paper analyzes the characteristics and effects of fiscal responsibility laws in seven countries -- Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, and Peru. Fiscal responsibility laws are designed to address the short time horizons of policymakers, free riders among government units, and principal agent problems between the national and subnational governments. The paper describes how the laws differ in the specificity of quantitative targets, the strength of sanctions, the methods for increasing transparency, and the level of government passing the law. Evidence shows that fiscal responsibility laws can help coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence...

As world leaders have agreed to massively support trade finance, this paper discusses the singularity of the issues related to trade finance in the context of the global economic crisis. Why should international trade finance be a particular issue of concern in the current circumstances? Are there specific market or government failures associated with trade finance that justify a special and differential treatment of the issue by policymakers? If so, what would then be the most appropriate policy instruments to address those concerns? The paper cautions against the notion of a large trade finance "gap," yet highlights the possible rationales and conditions for an effective intervention in support of trade finance.

The global financial crisis has already led to sharp downturns in the developing world. In the past, international aid has been able to offset partially the effects of crises that began in the developing world, but because this crisis began in the wealthy countries, donors may be less willing or able to increase aid in this crisis. Not only have donor-country incomes fallen, but the cause of the drop -- the banking and financial-sector crisis -- may exacerbate the effect on aid flows because of its heavy fiscal costs. This paper estimates how donor-country banking crises have affected aid flows in the past, using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2007. The analysis finds that banking crises in donor countries are associated with a substantial additional fall in aid flows, beyond any income-related effects, perhaps because of the high fiscal costs of crisis and the debt hangover in the post-crisis periods. In most specifications, aid flows from crisis-affected countries fall by an average of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis hits. In addition...

India has seen rapid growth in recent years in its program of infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPPs). Despite the surge in demand for finance, local financial markets coped well over the period to 2007 and even offered better terms as they became more used to the PPP model. But areas of possible concern have developed. Gearing has increased significantly, and financing terms mean that PPPs are more exposed to interest rate volatility causes for concern in a period of rising rates and reduced liquidity. Further growth in PPPs will likely require a broadening of the sources of financing once the present financial market turmoil has lessened. Addressing these concerns will call for policy reforms to capital markets and concession frameworks.

With the recent stock market frauds in markets around the world such as the Madoff case in the U.S. and the recent Satyam fraud in India, no nation can hold its head high and claim to have good corporate governance. The reality is that the problems of fraud, faulty audits, misleading accounts, lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, criminal destruction of records and a long list of other corporate governance violations, are not limited to emerging markets but are very much in evidence in developed markets as well. Given recent events then, the importance of sound corporate governance is becoming increasingly apparent. International organizations like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), along with major fund managers, are formulating sets of codes and principles that can be applied globally. It is also clear, however, that governments have generally done a poor job of policing the complex world of finance and that the greater part of the task will be left to self policing on the part of the participants. There is no doubt about it: sound corporate governance pays. Several studies undertaken by various organizations have shown that: there is a direct relationship between good corporate governance and investment returns. The oversight that comes from transparency and accountability creates a structure where the managers are discouraged from mismanaging the company...

This article reviews the main issues of regulating and supervising banks in emerging markets with a view toward evaluating the long-run options. Particular attention is paid to Latin America and East Asia. These economies face a severe policy commitment problem that leads to excessive bailouts and potential devaluation of claims of foreign investors. This exacerbates moral hazard and makes a case for importing external discipline (for example, acquiring foreign short-term debt). However, external discipline may come at the cost of excessive liquidation of entrepreneurial projects. The article reviews the tradeoffs imposed by external discipline and examines various arrangements, such as narrow banking, foreign banks and foreign regulation, and the potential role for an international agency or international lender of last resort.

This note outlines a short, to medium-term reform agenda to foster sound financial sector development. Mexico needs to broaden and deepen its financial system without compromising the financial stability gains of the last decade. Much more private investment is needed to transform the economy to boost productivity, and despite improvements in recent years, many households and firms still lack adequate access to financial services. Using the financial payments system to promote financial inclusion is a sound way to broaden access. However, experience in several countries has shown that accelerated (or forced) expansion of credit can harm rather than benefit customers. If financial institutions do not follow sound practices, they can fail, harming borrowers and depositors alike and creating social unrest. Institutional failures may also lead to costly bailouts, with substantial fiscal cost. An oversight system (both micro, and macro, prudential) that encourages prudent-risk taking and facilitates prompt resolution of failed institutions ensures that strategies for financial deepening do not compromise financial stability.

This paper studies the credit market implications and real effects of one the largest borrower bailout programs in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The study finds that the stimulus program had no effect on productivity, wages, or consumption, but led to significant changes in credit allocation and an increase in defaults. Post-program loan performance declines faster in districts with greater exposure to the program, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become significantly more sensitive to the electoral cycle after the program, suggesting the anticipation of future credit market interventions as an important channel through which moral hazard in loan repayment is intensified.

This paper first describes the ingredients the present crisis in the euro zone and then evaluates the key options that policy makers face in resolving the crisis and avoiding similar crises in the future. I argue that the crisis should not be seen as caused by government profligacy alone. In many troubled countries, an unsustainable build-up of private sector debt was involved as well. I argue that a more fundamental problem is that the euro zone lacks an adjustment mechanism for balance of payments crises that may arise in its member countries, with or without excessive government deficits. The metaphor of taps to be opened or closed by policy is used to discuss the core trade offs that policy makers face. I discuss monetary taps, bailout taps, austerity taps and devaluation taps. I propose a simple model of government bond markets with sovereign insolvency to be used in order to evaluate EU-type bailouts. I discuss the pros and cons of austerity as a precondition for such bailouts, and I criticize the use of Target2 as a mechanism to absorb balance of national payments crises.

The three papers in this thesis differ considerably with respect to methodology and topic; yet, they all reflect my overarching interest in the design of economic policies and the institutions that execute them. They are, also, testimony of the privilege to write a PhD thesis in Economics during times that leave little doubt about the relevance of thoughtful economic policy. My first, humble, contribution to designing these are the three papers in this thesis. As an introduction, I will proceed to briefly describe their contributions. In the first paper, I address the question of how diverse opinions (“beliefs”) among members of a monetary policy committee [MPC], as well as its institutional features, in particular, its size and its decision-making process, influence macroeconomic volatility. I answer this question in two parts: first, I explain the relationship between decision-making in committees and robust, or regret-minimising, decision-making. I show that the two can be equivalent under very specific conditions (on beliefs and the potential models of the economy). These conditions are hard to test empirically; therefore, I proceed, in the second part, to simulate an empirically motivated example, and, to compare the volatility generated by a...

In this thesis, I show that governments bail out banks because banks are critical to capitalist democracies. Banks enjoy a public safety net. Governments, however, can make banks pay for this protection. Two of this dissertation’s conclusions stand out. The first is that the influence of business through lobbying and other channels of instrumental power is exaggerated. Banks cannot secure sweetheart deals by pointing to their track record of campaign contributions. Bailouts are not for sale. During crises, governments can use banks’ dependence on the domestic market to force them to bear the bailout costs. Only highly international banks, can parry this threat by using their structural power strategically. The second conclusion is that financial crises remove veto points. They create a large threat and leave little time for deliberation, which prompts lawmakers defer to the executive branch. Thus, financial crises shift power from legislatures—even strong ones, like the US Congress—to the head of government.; Defence date: 24 November 2014; Examining Board: Professor Pepper D. Culpepper, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor Mark Hallerberg, Hertie School of Governance; Professor Ellen M. Immergut, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; Professor Hanspeter Kriesi...

Institutional lending in crisis is evaluated from a theoretical point of view. First, the share of senior loans in new loans is irrelevant under a given probability distribution of the country's resources. Second, seniority may partially alleviate the inefficiency of debt contracts when the distribution of resources is endogenous to the country's physical investment and effort towards success. Third, with multiple lending rate equilibria, institutional lending may induce a switch to a lower private loan rate if it can be done in a sufficiently large amount. Fourth, conditions are analyzed under which debt forgiveness is efficient under a financial shock.

The recent international financial crisis dealt a hard blow to the region's growth prospects, being reflected in reduced demand for financial services and tourism as well as falling remittances. This was combined in some cases with home grown macroeconomic imbalances and the need to face the costs of financial sector bailouts in other countries. More recently, policymakers have indicated the need to explore the use of tax incentives in order to foster much needed private investment. This policy note analyzes the issues associated with the use of tax incentives and reviews the challenges faced by the region, which has had a not altogether successful experience in controlling tax expenditures. The policy note is organized as follows: the first section explores the diverse nature of the Caribbean and Latin American group of countries referred to in this note: the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. This is followed by a word of caution regarding the emphasis on factor accumulation in explaining growth...

This paper investigates how government interventions into banking systems such as blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations affect banking competition. This debate is important because the pricing of banking products has implications for borrower and depositor welfare. Exploiting data for 124 countries that witnessed different policy responses to 41 banking crises, and using difference-in-difference estimations, the paper presents the following key results: (i) Government interventions reduce Lerner indices and net interest margins. This effect is robust to a battery of falsification and placebo tests, and the competitive response also cannot be explained by alternative forces. The competition-increasing effect on Lerner indices and net interest margins is also confirmed once the non-random assignment of interventions is accounted for using instrumental variable techniques that exploit exogenous variation in the electoral cycle and in the design of the regulatory architecture across countries. (ii) Consistent with theoretical predictions...

The authors use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal ('insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.

Using survey data from the UK, Stephanie Rickard finds that public support for bailouts varies by country and is dependant on factors such as beneficiary ties with the UK and the amount of issue-specific knowledge an individual has, with a greater percentage of support for the bailouts found within academia.

Since 2010, Ireland, Portugal and Greece have all received financial rescue packages, or bailouts. But who supports and opposes these bailouts, and why? Using survey data from the UK, Stephanie Rickard finds that public support for bailouts tends to depend on the beneficiary country; there is greater support for bailouts for countries such as Ireland, which have closer economic links to the UK.

When the recession hit many predicted that London would fare the worst. Henry Overman argues that while incomes and employment have contracted in London in the last two years, the capital’s high proportion of professional and service occupations as well as government interventions (including the bank bailouts) have shielded it from the worst of the recession thus far, and has even led to some above average rises in spending.

In early 2012, the Spanish state came under strong market pressure due to its engagement in round after round of large-scale bank bailouts. The country’s joint sovereignbank crisis shed new light on the nature of the euro area’s crisis. European decision-makers were forced to openly recognize the non-fiscal – that is, the banking and monetary – causes of sovereign distress and to accept the need for drastic policy solutions. The policy shift soon took concrete form with the launch of the Banking Union project in June 2012. The principal intention was to break the bank-sovereign link and to relieve the euro area’s weaker economies from the almost impossible burden of having to finance bank bailouts out of national fiscal resources. The mutualization of bailout costs through a common ‘fiscal backstop’ was, in other words, the key objective of the Banking Union as originally conceived. Subsequent policy choices, however, have marked a relaxation, if not partial abandonment, of this objective. The policy approach eventually adopted with regard to resolution financing in the context of the Banking Union’s Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is based on the burden-sharing norms of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)...

This thesis examines a number of aspects of a government policy of rescuing firms or enterprises that are in difficulties, with particular attention to the East European context. The first part of Chapter 2 examines a concept introduced by Janos Kornai, the "soft budget constraint", and argues that it should be interpreted as a state policy of bailouts of enterprises in financial difficulties. The second part of the chapter examines the effect on incentives of a state policy of bailouts, arguing that in principle a bailout policy has an ambiguous effect on enterprise performance. Chapter 3 looks at the causes behind a government policy of bailouts. A game-theoretic model is presented in support of the argument that a cause of a bailout policy may be that the government is unable to make a credible commitment not to bail out an enterprise. The model also shows that if the government can acquire a "reputation for toughness", its threat of "no bailouts" may be credible. The phenomenon of "storming" or rush-work to meet a deadline is also analysed. In Chapter 4 a model of economic natural selection is developed. The model demonstrates that profit-maximisation does not "summarise appropriately" the conditions for firm survival. If firms have market power...