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‣ Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

Carvalho, Artur Bezerra de
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Dissertação
Português
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The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally...

‣ Unemployment insurance reform – 1991–2006 : a new balance between rights and obligations in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain

Arcanjo, Manuela
Fonte: Blackwell Publishing Publicador: Blackwell Publishing
Tipo: Anotação
Publicado em //2012 Português
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The purpose of this article is twofold. First, focusing on unemployment insurance schemes, the article seeks to identify the development of social rights and obligations in four countries (France, Germany, Portugal and Spain), representative of the conservative regime, over the period 1991–2006. Second, the article aims to verify whether or not there was a common reform trajectory in time as well as in space, given the already known divergence over the appropriateness of classifying Mediterranean countries within the framework of a specific regime. Based on analysis of 25 legislative changes concerning entitlement and eligibility criteria, the study presents three major findings. First, the four insurance schemes reveal a new balance between (weaker) social rights and (stronger) obligations, which may indicate a trend toward a re-commodification of work. Second, Portugal adopted a specific trajectory while the Spanish reform process more closely resembled that carried out by France and Germany. Finally, two waves of reform may be identified: first, between 1991 and 1997 and justified by cost-containment concerns and, subsequently, from 2001 onwards, associated with a stronger recalibration of benefit rights.

‣ The Health Effects of US Unemployment Insurance Policy: Does Income from Unemployment Benefits Prevent Cardiovascular Disease?

Walter, Stefan; Glymour, Maria; Avendano, Mauricio
Fonte: Public Library of Science Publicador: Public Library of Science
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
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Objective: Previous studies suggest that unemployment predicts increased cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk, but whether unemployment insurance programs mitigate this risk has not been assessed. Exploiting US state variations in unemployment insurance benefit programs, we tested the hypothesis that more generous benefits reduce CVD risk. Methods: Cohort data came from 16,108 participants in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) aged 50–65 at baseline interviewed from 1992 to 2010. Data on first and recurrent CVD diagnosis assessed through biennial interviews were linked to the generosity of unemployment benefit programmes in each state and year. Using state fixed-effect models, we assessed whether state changes in the generosity of unemployment benefits predicted CVD risk. Results: States with higher unemployment benefits had lower incidence of CVD, so that a 1% increase in benefits was associated with 18% lower odds of CVD (OR:0.82, 95%-CI:0.71–0.94). This association remained after introducing US census regional division fixed effects, but disappeared after introducing state fixed effects (OR:1.02, 95%-CI:0.79–1.31).This was consistent with the fact that unemployment was not associated with CVD risk in state-fixed effect models. Conclusion: Although states with more generous unemployment benefits had lower CVD incidence...

‣ Unemployment Insurance: Efficiency Effects and Lessons for Developing Countries

Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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Unemployment insurance (UI) is the most common public income support program for the unemployed in developed countries.1 In these countries, it typically offers good protection: it covers the majority of employed persons, irrespective of occupation or industry, and provides adequate smoothening of consumption patterns. For example, studies on the U.S. find that the welfare of benefit recipient households is on average only 3-8 percent lower than the welfare of otherwise identical households, and that in the absence of unemployment insurance, average consumption expenditures would fall by about 20 percent. In the last decade, UI programs have been introduced in transition countries, and their use in developing countries is on the rise as well.

‣ Comparing Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Assistance

Vodopevic, Milan
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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Markets alone cannot provide adequate protection against the risk of unemployment. Private unemployment insurance (UI) fails because of informational problems: the so-called moral hazard (changes in behavior in the presence of insurance that are impossible or very costly to detect) and adverse selection problems (high-risk workers make insurance unattractive to average- and low-risk workers). Hence the mandate for social policy. But social policy has to deal with the same problems that render markets inefficient. Mandatory participation mitigates the problem of adverse selection, but the moral hazard problems remain. In addition, the existence of a social protection program may give rise to inefficiencies of its own. Particularly with the rise of unemployment in European Union in the last two decades, inefficiencies created by UI, the traditional and most widely used public program of income support for the unemployed in developed economies, have become more widely discussed, and solutions and alternatives sought.

‣ Expanding Social Insurance Coverage in Urban China

Giles, John; Wang, Dewen; Park, Albert
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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This paper first reviews the history of social insurance policy and coverage in urban China, documenting the evolution in the coverage of pensions and medical and unemployment insurance for both local residents and migrants, and highlighting obstacles to expanding coverage. The paper then uses two waves of the China Urban Labor Survey, conducted in 2005 and 2010, to examine the correlates of social insurance participation before and after implementation of the 2008 Labor Contract Law. A higher labor tax wedge is associated with a lower probability that local employed residents participate in social insurance programs, but is not associated with participation of wage-earning migrants, who are more likely to be dissuaded by fragmentation of the social insurance system. The existing gender gap in social insurance coverage is explained by differences in coverage across industrial sectors and firm ownership classes in which men and women work.

‣ Choosing a System of Unemployment Income Support : Guidelines for Developing and Transition Countries

Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publicador: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
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Mounting evidence suggests that excessive job protection reduces employment and labor market flows, hinders technological innovations, pushes workers into the informal sector, and hurts vulnerable groups by depriving them of job opportunities. Flexible labor markets stimulate job creation, investment, and growth, but they create job insecurity and displace some workers. How can the costs of such insecurity and displacements be minimized while ensuring that the labor market remains flexible? Each of the main unemployment income support systems (unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, unemployment insurance savings accounts, severance pay, and public works) has strengths and weaknesses. Country-specific conditions, chief among them labor market and other institutions, the capacity to administer each type of system, and the size of the informal sector, determine which system is best suited to developing and transition countries.

‣ Designing and Implementing Unemployment Benefit Systems in Middle and Low Income Countries : Key Choices between Insurance and Savings Accounts

Robalino, David A.; Weber, Michael
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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Several middle income countries are considering reforms of severance pay regulations to both increase flexibility for firms and better protect workers. Policy discussions then often revolve around whether to adopt an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme or unemployment individual savings accounts (UISAs). Proponents of the first emphasize its ability to pool risks and introduce an element of solidarity. Critics point to its potentially negative effects on labor supply as individuals can have fewer incentives to seek, take or keep jobs. In this paper, the authors show that UI and UISAs are, in fact, particular cases of a more general design and that the crucial policy choice is in terms of how redistribution - to cover benefits for those who cannot save enough is financed. The authors outline key features of this general design and discuss trade-offs and possible solutions. The authors discusses issues related to implementation and show how recent technological developments around biometric identification can facilitate the monitoring of conditionalities related to participation in job-search and training activities.

‣ Responsibility, equality, and unemployment insurance

CAPPELEN, Cornelius
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Português
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It is a central political goal to secure involuntarily unemployed individuals the same opportunities as others to pursue their conception of a good life. This goal reflects an ambition to combine an egalitarian and a liberal intuition. The egalitarian intuition is that any inequality between individuals must be justified by appealing to differences in some responsibility factors. The liberal intuition is that redistribution only can be justified by appealing to differences in some non-responsibility factors. In this dissertation I analyze how a system of unemployment insurance should ideally be designed in order to respect both the egalitarian and the liberal intuitions. The dissertation asks how the different unemployment insurance instruments, such as the UI benefit level, the entitlement conditions, the eligibility criteria, and the distribution of the costs associated with UI should ideally be designed and combined given that the aim is to maximize conformity to both the egalitarian and the liberal intuitions. The dissertation also asks how the different OECD unemployment insurance schemes have combined the egalitarian and the liberal intuitions in the design of their respective unemployment policy instruments.; Defense Date: 12/02/2010; Examining Board: Professor Christine Chwaszcza...

‣ Do unemployment benefit legislative changes affect job finding? Evidence from the Spanish 1992 UI reform act.

Arranz Muñoz, José María; Muñoz Bullón, Fernando; Muro, Juan
Fonte: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Publicador: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Português
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Using a rich administrative dataset on unemployment insurance benefit recipients, the current work analyses the Spanish 1992 Reform Act implemented to reduce the generosity of the unemployment compensation system –in particular, a decrease in the level of unemployment insurance benefits and in entitlement duration. For this purpose, we compare unemployment insurance exit rates for two large sub-samples of individuals: the first sub-sample includes those who started receiving unemployment insurance benefits in 1991 (the pre-reform sub-sample) and the second sub-sample includes those who did so during 1993 (the post-reform sub-sample). Results indicate that these legislative changes had a positive though modest effect on individuals’ exit rate from unemployment: the 10-percent decrease in unemployment insurance benefit levels was associated with a 5-percent increase in the transition rate out of unemployment, while the reduction implemented in the potential unemployment insurance duration implied a 2-percent increase in the hazard rate out of unemployment.

‣ Optimal Unemployment Insurance : Consumption versus Expenditure

Campos, Rodolfo G.; Reggio, Iliana
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/draft; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
Publicado em 01/02/2015 Português
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We study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in a framework that distinguishes between consumption and expenditure. We derive a "sufficient statistics" formula for optimal UI that is expressed terms of observable variables and can therefore be used in applied work. Recent research has shown that unemployed households pay less per unit of consumption than employed households. This finding has two counteracting effects on the optimal level of UI. On the one hand, consumption smoothing benefits identified from expenditure data overestimate the true marginal benefits of UI. On the other hand, UI benefits become more valuable because they buy more consumption when unemployed. In an optimal design, which effect dominates depends on the curvature of the utility function. We show that for relative risk aversion larger than one the first effect dominates, leading to lower levels of optimal UI.; We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Grants ECO2012-38134 and ECO2012-31358).

‣ Asset Based Unemployment Insurance

RENDAHL, Pontus
Fonte: European University Institute Publicador: European University Institute
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Português
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This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution policies provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth level, and thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the level of benefit payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The reason behind the latter result is twofold; in addition to the first-order insurance effect of wealth, an increase in non-labor income (wealth) amplifies the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job. During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of benefit payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous studies.

‣ Pooling, Saving, and Prevention : A Comprehensive Insurance Approach to Social Risk Management; Mancomunacion de esfuerzos, ahorro y prevencion : un enfoque de seguro integral para la gestion de los riesgos sociales

Packard, Truman
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Brief; Publications & Research
Português
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Individuals and societies can respond in a variety of ways when faced with the prospect of economic losses from shocks like natural disasters, sickness, sudden death, disability and unemployment. Social risk management is a conceptual framework encompassing three broad categories of response: prevention, mitigation, and coping. The comprehensive Insurance approach focuses on mitigation, offering a tool for determining which insurance instruments and preventive measures will be most effective given the size and frequency of various types of possible economic losses. This article explains the comprehensive insurance framework, and uses it to assess recent reforms in Chile's unemployment insurance system.

‣ Duration of Unemployment Benefits and Quality of Post-Unemployment Jobs: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

van Ours, Jan C.; Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
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This paper investigates how the potential duration of unemployment benefits affects the quality of post-unemployment jobs. It takes advantage of a natural experiment introduced by a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law that substantially reduced the potential benefit duration. Although this reduction strongly increased job finding rates, the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected. The paper finds that the law change had no effect on the type of contract (temporary versus permanent), the duration of the post-unemployment job, or the wage earned in the job.

‣ Unemployment Insurance Simulation Model (UISIM)

Fares, Jean; Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Brief; Publications & Research
Português
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This note describes the key features of the Unemployment Insurance Simulation Model (UISIM) - how the model is structured, what data inputs are needed, and what outputs the model generates (the model comes with user's and technical manuals, which provide detailed information about how to operate the model and how it calculates the outputs). For illustrative purposes, the note also presents an example where the model is used to generate simulations for a countrywide unemployment insurance (UI) system. The appendix to the note describes typical data sources and provides a detailed description of requisite data.

‣ Does Reducing Unemployment Insurance Generosity Reduce Job Match Quality?; Journal of Public Economics

van Ours, Jan C.; Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Journal Article; Journal Article
Português
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This paper analyzes how a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law affected the quality of jobs workers found after periods of unemployment. Taking advantage the "natural experiment" we show through difference-in-differences estimation results that reducing the potential duration of unemployment benefits had no detectable effect on wages, on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job, or on the duration of the post-unemployment job.

‣ How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia; Comparative Economic Studies

Vodopivec, Milan
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Journal Article; Journal Article
Português
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Applying a methodology similar to Feldstein and Altman (1998) to Slovenia's unemployment insurance (UI) system, the paper shows that unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a viable alternative to a modest, but not generous, UI system. Under the modest regime, only one quarter of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 43% ever experience a negative UISA balance; in contrast, under the generous regime, 49% of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 66% ever experience a negative balance. The simulations also show that the level of redistribution under UISAs lags behind the redistribution implied by the UI system.

‣ Unemployment, Skills, and Incentives : An Overview of the Safety Net System in the Slovak Republic

Sanchez-Paramo, Carolina
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
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The author studies the potential disincentive effects of unemployment insurance, and social assistance payments on the duration of unemployment in the Slovak Republic. For this purpose, she uses new, very detailed data on receipt of benefits from the Unemployment Registry (1990-2000) and the Labor Force Survey (1996, 1999, and 2000). She employs a flexible methodology that makes it possible to identify behavioral changes that may occur as the quantity, and duration of the benefits change over time, as well as behavioral differences between recipients, and non-recipients. This approach, she argues, constitutes a more accurate test for the presence of incentive, and disincentive effects, than those presented before in the literature. She expands the scope of her analysis, to study the effect of receiving benefits on several outcomes in addition to exit from unemployment (for example, job seeking behavior, and duration of unemployment). She finds important behavioral differences between those who receive benefits, and those who do not. Recipients tend to spend more time unemployed...

‣ Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

Bardey, David; Jaramillo, Fernando
Fonte: Facultad de Economía Publicador: Facultad de Economía
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/book; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2011 Português
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We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

‣ An analysis of unemployment insurance in Uruguay and discussion of proposed modifications

Amarante,Verónica; Bucheli,Marisa
Fonte: Cuadernos del CLAEH Publicador: Cuadernos del CLAEH
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/01/2008 Português
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Unemployment insurance is a type of contributory program which aims to provide transitory benefits and has three main objectives: provide workers with temporary income so they can select a job which is suited to their skills, reduce the decline in aggregate spending during recessions by stabilizing the income and consumption of those concerned, and reduce workers' resistance to productive restructuring. A review of international experiences shows that beyond differences in program design, the related problems tend to repeat themselves. In general terms, unemployment insurance programs may stimulate abusive behavior from workers and employers. This article systematizes the weaknesses of Uruguay's current unemployment insurance program. Statistical data are presented and the extent to which this program may be stimulating abusive behavior is discussed. Finally, we consider possible modifications.